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Abstract. From 2006 to 2012, the South Sudan Guinea Worm Eradication Program reduced new Guinea worm disease
(dracunculiasis) cases by over 90%, despite substantial programmatic challenges. Program logistics have played a key role
in program achievements to date. The program uses disease surveillance and program performance data and integrated
technical–logistical staffing to maintain flexible and effective logistical support for active community-based surveillance and
intervention delivery in thousands of remote communities. Lessons learned from logistical design and management can
resonate across similar complex surveillance and public health intervention delivery programs, such as mass drug adminis-
tration for the control of neglected tropical diseases and other disease eradication programs. Logistical challenges in various
public health scenarios and the pivotal contribution of logistics to Guinea worm case reductions in South Sudan underscore
the need for additional inquiry into the role of logistics in public health programming in low-income countries.
INTRODUCTION
As early as 2002, global disease eradication campaigners
understood that South Sudan would likely be a last bastion of
dracunculiasis,1 commonly known as Guinea worm disease
(GWD). During the 23-year civil war, GWD eradication sur-
veillance and interventions in South Sudan were supported
through a loose consortium of non-governmental organiza-
tions with limited success because of lack of a strong central
governmental coordinating body, weak information and logis-
tical systems, poor infrastructure, heavy seasonal rains coin-
ciding with peak disease transmission, and rampant insecurity.
The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement allowed the
newly created Ministry of Health, Republic of South Sudan
to launch the South Sudan Guinea Worm Eradication Pro-
gram (SSGWEP). (South Sudan gained full independence
from Sudan in July of 2012, becoming the Republic of South
Sudan.) In 2006, the program reported 20,582 new GWD
cases from 3,137 villages in 7 of 10 states and 39 of 80 counties.
South Sudan then accounted for 82% of cases globally.2
In 2012, the program reported 521 new cases, a 97% reduction
since 2006 (Ministry of Health, Republic of South Sudan,
unpublished data).
Logistics provide the means to make the right thing possi-
ble at the right place and time.3,4 Defined by the Council
of Supply Chain Management Professionals (2010) as “the
process of planning, implementing, and controlling proce-
dures for the efficient and effective transportation and storage
of goods . . . from the point of origin to the point of consump-
tion,” logistics are a primary reason for the 97% reduction
in GWD annual incidence. For public health practitioners,
useful logistical guidelines exist. (The John Snow, Inc/U.S.
Agency for International Development [USAID] Deliver
Project provides an array of useful practical guides and policy
papers, including The Logistics Handbook, a Practical Guide
for Supply Chain Managers in Family Planning and Health
Programs [available at http://deliver.jsi.com]. Another useful
handbook, written for logistics in humanitarian disasters, is
McGuire’s Handbook of Humanitarian Health Care Logistics
[available at www.humanitarianhealthcarelogistics.com].) How-
ever, a search for publically available, peer-reviewed litera-
ture on the role of logistics in global health (generally) and
disease eradication (specifically) reveals limited available
sources. Logistical challenges have negatively impacted, to
name a few, efforts to combat lymphatic filariasis,5 trachoma,6
polio,7 smallpox,3 malaria, tuberculosis, and human immuno-
deficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/
AIDS)8; however, related literature on effective logistical
system design and management approaches is sparse. This
paper is intended for public health practitioners and policy-
makers working in low-income countries. It discusses the key
role of logistics in GWD eradication in South Sudan and its
contribution to the how of disease eradication, including logis-
tical system design considerations, characteristics, management
approaches, and key lessons learned.
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS:
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
“Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which
work out the plans of strategy and tactics” (General Antoine
Henri Jomini, Precis de l’Art de la Guerre, 1838).
Disease eradication requires effective and efficient techni-
cal, logistical, and administrative support structures.9 GWD
eradication strategy and tactics, designed around disease epi-
demiology in South Sudan and associated contextual consid-
erations, shape SSGWEP support structures and associated
management approaches.
GWD eradication strategy. Eradication campaigns require
a level of intervention delivery and surveillance substantially
surpassing the level of disease control programs.10 Eradica-
tion programs must interrupt disease transmission every-
where as rapidly as possible. Therefore, case containment
and sensitive and specific surveillance are fundamental to the
strategy and foundational for program interventions. The
SSGEWP attempts to detect every case (defined as a person
with one or more worms emerging from his/her body in a
calendar year) and contain every worm. Case containment
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prevents a worm from releasing its larvae into a water source
(Figure 1). Containment requires detection within 24 hours
of worm emergence, case management every 24 hours, and
supervisory confirmation of containment within 7 days.
The village is the basic unit of surveillance. The program
maintains an updated list of villages under active surveillance
and a complete line list of all detected cases. Generally, villages
remain under active surveillance until reporting no cases for
3 consecutive years and no established population movements
with known endemic villages. The SSGWEP logistical system
must support continuous daily active surveillance among
households in villages under active surveillance and delivery
of other interventions in all endemic villages. Program logistics
must also support the necessary supervisory structures.
The epidemiology and programmatic environment in South
Sudan dictate the design of program logistics. In 2006, based
on data that would be subsequently validated over years
of active surveillance, the SSGWEP understood that trans-
mission took place in four foci (Figure 2). In endemic areas,
GWD transmission typically occurs in rainy season settle-
ments located on relatively higher and drier ground compared
with dry season settlements. Because of heavy population
movement and low safe water coverage, the level of transmis-
sion risk across villages within a county remains relatively
static. The physical environment in endemic areas, such as
Warrap and Lakes states, largely consists of seasonal swamps,
restricting transport of supplies and making transport, when
possible, slow and expensive.
SSGWEP tactics. GWD eradication deploys a comple-
mentary intervention package applied simultaneously that is
appropriate to the different stages of the transmission cycle.
Program interventions include cloth and pipe filters (with a
100 +100-mmmesh; Vestergaard, Lausanne, Switzerland), which
remove the intermediate host of Guinea worm, called copepods,
from drinking water. Chemical vector control using the larvi-
cide ABATE temephos (BASF Corporation, Florham Park,
NJ) controls copepod populations in unsafe water sources.
Health education and behavior change efforts bolster com-
munity uptake of program interventions.
Logistical impact of person, place, and time on GWD
eradication in South Sudan. The village is the primary unit of
surveillance, because it is the main location where targeted
populations reside. In South Sudan, different ethnic groups
populate endemic areas, but all communities are pastoralist.
Villages can be, in whole or part, depopulated during the
driest months, because whole families migrate with their
cattle, only to return when the rains and planting season
begin. Surveillance must track mobile populations throughout
the year, and logistical support must enable surveillance in all
places that target communities inhabit throughout the year.
Generally, the annual peak transmission season corresponds
with the rainy season from April to September (Table 1). The
timing and severity of the seasonal rains and resulting flooding
are primary determinants for logistical system design. The pro-
gram defines logistical coverage areas for support bases to
mitigate poor road accessibility to endemic villages. The rainy
Figure 1. Guinea worm lifecycle.
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season necessitates decentralization of materials and execution
of technical and logistics activities according to a seasonal
implementation calendar.
SSGWEP LOGISTICAL DESIGN
Locating logistical resources. War and neglect left South
Sudan with a programmatic environment characterized by
poor road networks, a weak primary healthcare system, and
regular insecurity. Since 2006, South Sudanese primary
healthcare structures have developed slowly, with limited
extension services in endemic communities. The SSGWEP
could not rely on or effectively integrate its efforts with
nascent primary healthcare structures, because those struc-
tures were too weak to reliably support intervention delivery
at the level necessary to break transmission. For the same
reasons, the program could not rely on other government or
private sector capabilities. Thus, the SSGWEP designed and
built its own logistical (and surveillance and intervention
delivery) system to meet technical requirements and over-
come environmental challenges.
The SSGWEP uses a hub-and-spoke logistical model
designed to meet the needs of the implementation environ-
ment.11 Covering defined regions, there are three central hubs
serving as logistical foci (Figure 3): Kapoeta, Rumbek, and
Juba. Hubs are part of a network geographically placed to
facilitate connectivity between themselves, procurement loca-
tions, and satellite distribution points (i.e., spokes).12 Each
hub is located on an all-weather road accessible by a heavy
truck from the primary procurement point: Nairobi, Kenya.
Field offices serve a similar, although less comprehensive,
function as logistical support bases for field stores within
payams (subdistricts) and by extension, the villages within a
defined coverage area.
As part of the hub-and-spoke model, SSGWEP uses
decentralized warehousing4,13 to position materials as close as
possible to targeted villages. The approach maximizes avail-
ability and minimizes transport costs, especially during the
rainy season when intervention materials, such as cloth and
pipe filters, are most needed. Cloth filters flow from procure-
ment locations to hubs to field offices to field stores to villages.
Village volunteers distribute them to households and maintain
a small stock for replacement purposes.
Systemic approaches to controlling logistical flows.
Through hub-and-spoke and warehousing systems, the
SSGWEP uses two approaches to determine procurement and
material flows.14 First, during annual allocations, the Secretar-
iat uses previous year epidemiologic data to dictate materials,
quantities, delivery times, and destinations and pushes them to
the peripheral locations. As shown in Table 2, non-endemic
villages under active surveillance and endemic villages receive
different pre-defined intervention packages based on levels
Figure 2. GWD-endemic focal areas and ethnic groups in 2006.
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of transmission risk. Endemic villages (reporting indigenous
cases during the current or previous year) are more likely to
experience transmission, and thus, they are a higher priority
than other villages under active surveillance.
Second, in a subordinate requisition or pull system,
SSGWEP field offices request materials, destinations, delivery
timing, and quantities from an assigned hub. Requisitions meet
unforeseen needs, such as when field staff identify new villages
requiring surveillance. Pull typically happens during the trans-
mission (rainy) season, when movements are more compli-
cated, costly, and slower. A well-developed hub-and-spoke
system is key to supporting both logistics flows.
To maximize vehicle availability, the program emphasizes
scheduled preventative maintenance. Trained mechanics and a
fully functional automotive workshop are in each hub (Table 3).
Mechanics travel regularly to field sites. Decentralized stocks of
automotive spare parts further minimize mechanical down-
time.15 Decentralized maintenance reduces the time that it
takes to repair non-operating mechanical assets. Additionally,
the vehicle fleet consists of similar vehicle models, reducing
time and expense by facilitating easy bulk procurement of spare
parts and easing the burden on program mechanics.
Management approaches to improve logistical functioning.
Logistical system design, no matter how well-suited to
programmatic demands and environment, does not necessar-
ily translate into an effective and efficient system. The pro-
gram uses disease surveillance and program performance data
together with integrating logistical and technical responsibili-
ties to ensure logistical effectiveness.
Data-driven planning. The SSGWEP collects and validates
surveillance and performance data through regular documented
supervision at all program levels (Figure 4). Supervision
extends to every village under active surveillance. The program
conducts systematic data quality checks and cleaning as data
are transferred from the village to the national Secretariat.
Supervisors confirm the existence of villages, their physical
locations (including geographic coordinates), demographic
data, and epidemiologic information. Therefore, supervision
strengthens disease surveillance and monitoring of intervention
delivery, improves data quality, and reinforces rational logisti-
cal planning and resource deployment (Figure 4). This process
is not possible without significant initial and ongoing invest-
ment in logistics.
Data quality since 2006 improved alongside the logistical
capacity supporting data collection and supervision. By 2008,
surveillance data from the three Kapoeta counties showed
relatively early transmission beginning annually in March.
Thus, the program put logistical support and surge capacity
in place by February. From 2008 to 2009, timely delivery of
logistical support helped boost case containment (54–73%;
Kapoeta counties reported 1,350 and 675 cases in 2008 and
2009, respectively), endemic village chemical vector control
coverage (69–72%), and endemic village cloth filter coverage
(84–99%), and cases declined (–50%).
Data-driven planning is instrumental to an effective and effi-
cient logistical system. Field managers, known as technical
advisors (TAs), oversee program surveillance, interventions,
and logistical support in a defined geographic area. They create
annual microplans identifying forecasted technical and logisti-
cal needs for their respective areas. By planning logistics for the
coming year immediately after the recently concluded trans-
mission season in August/September, the program maximizes
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the time between knowing what and how much logistical
support is needed and when it must be delivered (before the
next transmission season). Microplans capture the logistical
and technical support required to implement interventions at
a level necessary to break GWD transmission in the coming
year. The planning process results in the total forecasted
logistical needs of a given TA program area for the coming
year. The program uses a mathematical forecasting model14
based on disease burden (numbers of cases as well as
endemic and at-risk villages), demographics (population and
households), and intervention coverage required to break
transmission. For example, data-driven planning allowed the
program in 2009 to successfully pre-position cloth filters in
Warrap State. The state then had 193,453 targeted house-
holds in 5,119 endemic and at-risk villages. The program-
defined intervention package required availability of four
cloth filters for every targeted household to maintain a viable
filter throughout the year. In 2009, the program pre-positioned
over 800,000 filters and distributed 787,425 before (initial
distribution) and during (replacement distributions) the rainy/
transmission season. Successful pre-positioning of cloth filters
in Warrap State led to 99% coverage of endemic villages and
contributed to a 43% decrease in cases (Warrap reported
1,193 and 675 cases in 2009 and 2010, respectively).
Functional integration. The SSGWEP integrates logistical
and technical management (Figure 5). Such integration has
proven effective in other public health efforts, including erad-
ication programs.3 Field officers, TAs, and to an extent,
village-based volunteers manage technical implementation,
enabling logistical support in their respective coverage areas.
Figure 3. Logistical hubs and field offices with cloth and pipe filters distributed by logistical hubs in 2012.
Table 2
Interventions in endemic and non-endemic villages under active surveillance
Endemic villages Non-endemic village under active surveillance
Surveillance: Two or more trained village volunteers, daily house-to-house
surveillance by volunteer, daily visits by supervisor
Surveillance: one trained village volunteer, daily house-to-house
surveillance, supervisor visits weekly
Cloth filters (four times per year) Cloth filter (one time per year)
Pipe filters (80% of population)
All water sources associated with current or previous year cases treated
with ABATE
Medical supplies for case management and containment
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Each program level requires logistical support and in turn,
provides logistical support to subordinate levels. Again, using
the example of microplans, after TAs forecast their needs,
the Secretariat verifies and allocates an intervention and
logistical package. Using surveillance data collected from
village volunteers and verified by TAs, the Secretariat iden-
tifies program areas requiring more or less logistical support
than requested in the plans. It then compiles all microplans
to create program-wide procurement and shipping plans.
Logistical capacities. From 2006 to 2012, SSGWEP logistical
capacity consistently increased: technical advisors increased
from 16 to 79, suboffice warehouses increased from 11 to 49,
and 4 +4 vehicles increased from 29 to 49. Increased capacity
translated to increased outputs. The number of filters distrib-
uted generally corresponds to the evolving number of villages
under active surveillance (Figure 6), but the program focused
first on filter (and other intervention) coverage in endemic
villages (Figure 7). In 2007, with over 22,000 villages under
active surveillance, the peak number of filters was distributed
(approximately 9.5 million). The number of water source treat-
ments also increased from 263 in 2006 to 12,591 in 2012.
The program showed marked progress in terms of improving
surveillance, reducing endemic villages, and increasing inter-
vention coverage.
Intervention coverage is expressed as a proportion of
endemic villages receiving the intervention according to pro-
gram norms. Coverage changes yearly depending on interven-
tions reaching endemic villages (numerator) in the prescribed
manner and total number of endemic villages (denominator).
Endemic villages were supplied pre-rainy season to ensure
availability before cases occurred, because during and after
rainy season distribution was impossible. Reductions in
endemic villages (denominator) were a function of improving
surveillance sensitivity and specificity as well as successes
in breaking transmission within them—none of which would
have been possible without a robust logistical system. For the
numerator, increased intervention coverage was a direct
result of increased logistical capacity.
Logistical costs. Total logistical costs peaked in 2007 at
over $8.6 million and since then, averaged over $4.5 million
annually. With the exception of the push in 2007 to rapidly
build the SSGWEP logistical system (and the relatively large
number of villages under active surveillance), with corre-
sponding one-time large capital expenditures, logistical costs
have remained relatively stable (Figure 8). Logistical costs
broken down by the major logistical components of main-
tenance/construction, materials/warehousing, and shipping/
transport show that material costs decreased along with the
number of endemic villages.
DISCUSSION
In past disease eradication efforts, logistical support
contributed to success, such as with smallpox,3 and failure,
such as with the aborted malaria eradication efforts in the
mid-20th century.16 The program learned numerous lessons
in the process of establishing and strengthening program
logistics, some of which will be relevant to other public health
efforts in low-resource environments.
Lessons learned from SSGWEP logistical implementation.
Lesson 1: logistical systems are costly in eradication programs.
Even with decreasing caseloads and endemic villages, logisti-
cal costs remain substantial. Since the 2007 peak in costs and
villages under active surveillance, staff, suboffices, and vehi-
cles have increased, translating to substantial ongoing costs
for maintenance and shipping/transport to reach remote loca-
tions. Overall costs for materials have decreased, because
endemic villages, which receive the bulk of intervention mate-
rials, have decreased substantially.
Logistical costs have, however, remained substantial for two
reasons. First, from a management perspective, the program
enhanced supervisory structures to increase momentum to
elimination by improving the quality of surveillance and inter-
vention delivery. Supervisory structures require transport, sup-
plies, and maintenance. To increase the rate of case reductions,
since 2006, the program expanded its logistical capability,
despite successive reductions in cases and endemic villages.
Second, since 2010, logistical costs remain substantial,
because the number of villages under active surveillance has
remained largely static. The SSGWEP sacrifices cost savings
from reductions in numbers of villages targeted to increase
surveillance sensitivity. Weak existing primary healthcare
structures and highly mobile populations in endemic areas
necessitate maintaining active surveillance in thousands of
villages with no documented transmission in the past 3 years.
Adequate financing allows the prioritization of impact
over cost. However, programmatic complacency or reinfec-
tion of non-endemic villages could result in substantial oppor-
tunity and long-term direct costs, far outweighing upfront
capital costs given the 1-year incubation period/lifecycle for
dracunculiasis. Despite the investment necessary for such
comprehensive geographic coverage, several financially and
Table 3
SSGWEP transport and maintenance resources in 2012
Resource Quantity
Vehicles (4 +4) 49
Heavy trucks 10
Motorcycles 198
Mechanics 6
Automotive workshops 3
Figure 4. Continuous quality improvement cycle for SSGWEP
logistical system.
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programmatically costly outbreaks have temporarily set the
program back, a dynamic that would have been exacerbated
had there not been the investment in the system to detect and
respond quickly and effectively to outbreaks.
Lesson 2: management approaches are key to effective
logistics. SSGWEP logistical and technical systems are intrinsi-
cally linked. Technical–logistical integration combine participa-
tory and directive decision-making. As a result, the program
benefits from the efficiency of directive decision-making
and high levels of commitment that are characteristic of par-
ticipatory approaches.17,18 Despite the added burden on tech-
nical staff, integration ultimately improves surveillance,
supervision, and intervention delivery. Those individuals
tasked with technical implementation are also responsible
for logistical implementation and decision-making. Technical
and logistical implementers/decision-makers are regularly in
targeted villages directly assessing whether logistical support
is sufficient to achieve eradication, thereby maximizing effi-
ciencies at the village level. Additionally, technical–logistical
integration creates a horizontal organizational structure,
which further improves efficiency. Integration maintains
program focus on the organizational goal18 of eradicating
GWD. Integrated structures minimize competing priorities
and inefficient action.
Lesson 3: disease surveillance and program performance
data are an effective basis of logistical planning and execution.
Businesses use profits to measure effectiveness; the SSGWEP
uses case numbers and key performance indicators. As the
program increased supervision, surveillance and program
data quality improved, facilitating more effective logistical
and technical forecasting, planning, and implementation. In
Kapoeta in 2008, the enhanced understanding of transmission
seasonality permitted appropriate timing of supply deliveries,
Figure 5. SSGWEP logistical and technical management structure in 2012 (Ministry of Health, Republic of South Sudan, unpublished data).
Figure 6. Total pipe and cloth filters distributed and villages
under active surveillance from 2006 to 2012 (Ministry of Health,
Republic of South Sudan, unpublished data).
Figure 7. New GWD cases by year and endemic village annual
intervention coverage rates from 2006 to 2012 (Ministry of Health,
Republic of South Sudan, unpublished data).
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ensuring that intervention materials were in place before
transmission season.
Additionally, as in any complex public health program,
priorities compete. However, quality surveillance data allow
for effective prioritization. Supervisors must analyze field
staff and volunteer demands for supplies during monthly
refresher trainings held with thousands of community volun-
teers. A simple but accurate list of villages ranked by previous
year cases allows TAs to predict the likely location and timing
of current year cases and thus, dynamically prioritize who gets
what supplies at what times.
Evidence-based planning allows for rational program imple-
mentation. It also reduces logistical workload. The Secretariat
can accurately forecast logistical needs and allocate resources
to maximize impact where transmission occurs. Need-based
planning allows for effective pre-positioning of program sup-
plies, thus minimizing requests and associated time wastage
from demand-driven or pull logistical support. Surveillance
data also provide a verifiable basis to control resource wastage
and prevent urgent requests for resupply resulting from misuse.
An inherent challenge from reliance on a non-logistical
data collection system to guide logistical implementation is
that, as the logistical system matured, the program often
lacked microlevel data common to logistical planners that
are used to identify logistical bottlenecks. For example, only
after 2012 could the program accurately track delivery times
for all ordered supplies and vehicle indicators, such as fleet
miles covered or fleet fuel consumption.
Lesson 4: flexibility is essential to success. Regardless of the
quality of planning and implementation, unexpected needs
arise, and program managers must be able to respond. Just as
it was crucial to smallpox eradication,19 logistical flexibility
has been a key feature of the SSGWEP. The approaches of
technical–logistical integration and data-driven planning pro-
duce a flexible logistical system capable of dealing with a
dynamic epidemiologic and programmatic environment.
Central to flexibility and dictated by the quality of active
surveillance and supervision is the need in disease eradication
to quickly address identified technical gaps.3 Flexibility
requires readily available personnel, materials, maintenance,
and transport capacity to act when and where needed.19
Thus, the program uses decentralized warehousing and the
hub-and-spoke model.
In 2010, the program detected an outbreak in Bakder, Tonj
South County, a village not previously under active surveil-
lance. Decentralized warehousing allowed for rapid usage of
nearby resources. Cases were first detected in late June, and
by July, the program achieved 100% cloth and pipe filter
coverage and treated all unsafe water sources. The program
contained 85% of all cases and thus, achieved an 86% case
reduction the next year.
The SSGWEP invests heavily in transport and maintenance
capabilities to ensure optimal flexibility. It is essential to
move staff and materials when needed, including in the rainy/
transmission season when movement by foot is sometimes the
only option. By 2012, the program had eight military-grade
trucks suitable for rainy season transport. To increase transport
availability, the SSGWEP invests substantially in decentral-
ized preventative maintenance. Between 2006 and 2012,
maintenance-dedicated staff grew from zero to eight, and the
SSGWEP can now monitor and verify daily preventative
maintenance performed on each vehicle.
Regular direct communication between field staff and senior
managers without necessarily immediately involving a direct
supervisor was one key to the success of small pox eradication
in India.9 Level jumping is an important means for field staff to
efficiently communicate needs to the Secretariat. However,
conflicts can arise when information flows regularly or unnec-
essarily bypasses direct supervisors, negating necessary over-
sight. Consistent lack of adherence to program structures by
field staff has, at times, undermined the hierarchical structure
necessary to coordinate and supervise such a complex program.
Senior supervisors only allow and encourage level jumping in
specific situations, such as when an outbreak occurs or there is
breakdown in logistical support. In such situations, a TA can
efficiently communicate with the Secretariat, who in turn, can
ensure appropriate resource mobilization.
Because of the need to respond effectively to cases within a
challenging physical environment, speed and decentralization
of logistical resources can undermine logistical controls.
Logistical resources, especially in remote field offices, have,
at times, been misused, undermining program effectiveness.
The decision in 2009 to cease decentralization of specific
expensive vehicle spare parts unnecessary for routine preven-
tative maintenance sought to balance maintaining logistical
flexibility with not foregoing basic controls. Additionally,
field personnel have occasionally acted independently, con-
trary to technical guidelines. Such actions have been exacer-
bated by the ability to deploy logistical capacities without
prior approval. On-site supervision and robust monthly
reporting can detect and mitigate inappropriate actions, but
they require constant programmatic attention (and logistics).
Broader implications of logistical lessons learned in public
health programming. The debate on the long-term benefits
of vertical public health programs and how to effectively inte-
grate existing vertical structures into horizontal health sys-
tems continues.20–22 Because of the intensity of eradication
programs, associated logistical investments are higher than
in disease control programs. However, vertical programs can
serve as building blocks for health systems development.23
Some of the infrastructure, processes, approaches, and per-
sonnel could be adapted and adopted to establish and/or
strengthen community-based disease surveillance, monitor
public health interventions, and generally, document public
health outcomes. Specifically, programs requiring significant
community-level interaction (for example, mass drug admin-
istration for neglected tropical diseases, routine immunization
campaigns, and disease eradication programs) could benefit
from the logistical approaches and system designs addressed
in this paper. Integrated technical–logistical staffing reduces
Figure 8. SSGWEP non-personnel logistical costs by type
(2006–2012).
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personnel needs, because one person covers logistical and
technical responsibilities. It also ensures strong linkages
between health outcomes and the strategies and tactics used
to achieve said outcomes. Surveillance data-driven logistical
planning improves temporal and geographic pre-positioning
of public health resources. Furthermore, implementers can
adapt decentralized warehousing, maintenance, and transport
networks to support relevant public health programs.
CONCLUSION
Because logistics play an essential role in many public health
efforts, the amount of investment required (when done effec-
tively), and the limited availability of related peer-reviewed
research, the study of logistics in public health deserves addi-
tional attention. As GWD elimination in South Sudan
approaches, there is an opportunity to adapt some aspects of
the SSGWEP logistical system into the emerging public health
system before transmission is interrupted nationwide (for
example, in areas where active surveillance must be maintained
but where there are no currently endemic villages). Careful
consideration should be given in this process to carefully select
the logistical design and approaches relevant to national public
health priorities while not jeopardizing Guinea worm eradica-
tion achievements to date. If the Republic of South Sudan, with
donor help, can leverage existing SSGEWP logistical capabili-
ties, a legacy of strengthened public health logistics would be a
meaningful additional benefit to the end of GWD.
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